Economie in ontwikkeling: ECB & het voorspellen van luchtkastelen

donderdag 6 augustus 2009

ECB & het voorspellen van luchtkastelen

De ECB heeft een interessant working paper op gesteld over de boom en bust cyclus van de huizenmarkt. In het paper worden periodes geIdentificeerd waarin een luchtkasteel wordt opgebouwd en wanneer het luchtkasteel wordt lek geprikt. De data die ze gebruiken bevatten gelukkig ook waarnemingen voor Nederland. Wat hier opvalt is dat de ECB voor Nederland een huizenmarkt boom signaleert van 1971-1978 en 1996-2001. De correctie vindt plaats in 1979-1985 en....niet. De boom van 1996-2001 is volgens de auteurs van het artikel nog niet gecorrigeerd

Paar aardige andere noties: The pattern of booms and busts as visualised in Figure 2 yields some more interesting results. The largest group of countries (8) could be called “repeated boom
busters”: the Nordics and the large European countries except Germany (i.e., Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK). Another three countries, Australia, Canada and the US could be called “new boomers”. Six countries, including Japan, Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium could be labelled “long cyclers” where the Dutch boom already came to an end a few years ago and the upswing in Belgium is too slow and interrupted to be statistically labelled as a boom. Germany seems to be the odd country out where house prices have been relatively stable and even the recent drawn-out bust has been
relatively shallow.

Opvallend: Furthermore, the most recent booms have been longer (6-11 years instead of 3-8 previously). If it had not been for short interruptions (around 2001 when the dot-com bubble burst and economic growth slowed), we would have seen “mega-booms” in Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Norway lasting about 15 years. The most recent busts have also been longer than earlier ones with Japan’s 15 years followed closely by Switzerland’s ten and Germany’s eight.

Voor die bust cyclus kunnen ze gegeven de huidige stand vand economie nog wel een paar jaar bijtellen.

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Publicaties

-Moons en Petri (2006), Hoger onderwijs een stelsel met voeten zonder vleugels, Elsevier TH&MA, Amsterdam
- Bergeijk en Moons (2008), Economic Diplomacy and Economic Security, in C.Costa (ed.), New Forntiers of Economic Diplomacy, Lisboa
-Chrisstoffels en Moons (2009), Geen winstmaximalisatie maar schuldminimalisatie, Kwartaaltijdschift Economie, Jaargang 2009 uitgave 2, Tilburg/ Leuven
-Moons en Oldersma (2009), Amerika in de crisis, ESB, Den Haag
-Moons en Oldersma (2009), China in de crisis, ESB, Den Haag
-Moons en Oldersma (2009), Japan in de crisis, ESB, Den Haag
-Moons en van der Zee (2009), Rusland en de crisis, ESB, Den Haag
-Bergeijk en Moons (2010), Economic Security: A meta-analysis, Paris
-Fortanier en Moons (2010), Foreign investors in the Netherlands: heterogeneous employment and productivity effects. De Economist
-Economic Diplomacy Works: A Meta Analysis, ETSG conference paper, Kopenhagen 2011
-Productivity and Internationalisation:A micro data approach. Economist (article 9175), Springer Science + Business, 2011
- Moons en van Bergeijk (2011), De effectiviteit van economische diplomatie, ESB, Den Haag
- The effect of economic diplomacy on international flows. IDB workshop "The effects of export and investmentpromotion". IDB:Washington 2012
- What are the effects of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade" International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy, 2012

Lessen van Keynes

1) "It is the nature of organized investment markets, under the influence of purchasers largely ignorant of what they are buying and of speculators who are more concerned with forecasting the next shift of market sentiment than with a reasonable estimate of the future yield of capital assets, that, when disillusion falls upon a over-optimistic and over-bought market, it should fall with sudden and even catastrophic force."

2) "If a reduction in the rate of interest was capable of providing an effctive remedy by itself, it might be possible to achieve a recovery without the elapse of any considerable interval of time and by means more or less directly under the control of the monetary authority. But, in fact, this is not usually the case; and it is not so easy to revive the marginal efficiency of capital, determined, as it is, by the uncontrollable and disobedient psychology of the business world.

3) "The ideas of economist and political philosophers, both when they are wright and when tyhey are wrong, are more powerful than commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from intellectual influense are usually the slaves of some defunct economist."